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PROLOGUE: FALLING 
I remember how clear and blue the sky was as we climbed away from 
Chicago's O'Hare International Airport. I was a United pilot based in San 
Francisco flying my leg heading homeward. The crisp fall morning made 
me reminisce about Septembers from my New England childhood and 
anticipating the start of school. The captain reached over and tore off the 
paper message that spit out from the cockpit printer: "SECURITY BREACH. 
LAND ASAP. DON'T ALARM PASSENGERS." We weren't too surprised to receive 
the instructions. We had already heard several Delta airliners diverting. By 
the time it was our turn, air traffic controllers no longer sounded confused. 
Everyone was coming out of the sky. We assumed some late-running pas-
senger must have skipped through the airport security checks and we'd be 
back flying shortly, once things got sorted out on the ground. We couldn't 
have been more wrong. The world was fragmenting. 
I increased the range of my navigation screen and peered into the fu-
ture, calculating our descent. 
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"Where would you like to land?" the captain asked. 
"Looks like Omaha's best." 
"Omaha it is then," he confirmed and set about communicating our 
request. 
We landed, taxied to the gate, and parked, as ill informed about the 
developing events as we were when airborne. I opened the cockpit door 
and a passenger wandered up. He shared news headlines about some esca-
lating crisis streaming across his pager. One story claimed an airliner had a 
navigation failure and had hit a skyscraper in New York. 
"That's ridiculous," I thought. "What pilot would fly into a building on 
a morning so clear you could almost see the future from the flight deck at 
35,000 feet?" 
Nothing made sense. 
The captain left the cockpit to investigate. I trailed behind slowly, only 
then realizing that our 298 passengers and eleven flight attendants had 
already quickly deplaned. Pausing in the vacant first-class cabin, I snapped 
my mobile phone open and speed-dialed home. My partner picked up on 
the first ring. 
"Looks like I may be late landing," I said. "We've run into some se-
curity problem; don't know what's up. But, we should be back in the air 
soon." 
"Don't you know what's happened?" 
"Happened?" 
"It's fallen!" 
"Fallen—what's fallen?" 
"Everything: the Twin Towers, New York, airplanes. People are jump-
ing out of buildings!" 
"What?" 
"Are you all right?" 
"Yes, yes." 
"Thank God. Check the TV!" 
I found a television in the ground crew lounge and joined a group of 
about fifty other aviation employees crammed into a room designed for 
about twenty. Pilots, flight attendants, mechanics, customer service reps, 
baggage handlers, dispatchers, and fuelers from a variety of companies— 
we were all in this together. The second building, the North Tower, of 
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New York's World Trade Center had just collapsed. The image played 
over and over on the television: first one tower, then the other, imploding 
in a heap of grey dust. One minute it was up, and the next it was down. 
Ashes to ashes, dust to dust. It was a beacon on the horizon, solid and 
steady, a place where people worked, dedicated their lives, provided a ser-
vice, and shared an identity. And now it was hit and falling. 
We were in that kind of nightmare place where something horrible is 
happening and you can't make it stop. Frightened yet fascinated, we kept 
watching. As if you'll be rewarded with clarity if you just stand watch long 
enough. We didn't know it then but we were watching the world change 
irreparably, right before our eyes. 
This book, written more than a decade after that fateful day in Septem-
ber 2001, attempts to make sense of what happened next within Amer-
ica's airline industry. In particular, my aim is to reconceptualize the 
idea of risk and safety, drawing parallels between aviation and other 
risk management professions, particularly finance. The question moti-
vating my analysis is simple: Has profit seeking been allowed to t rump 
safety in the US commercial airline industry? If so, what are the reper-
cussions for risk—should we expect another major airline crash some-
time soon? 
If this topic immediately makes you feel uneasy, that is good. Aviation 
safety is an area that should concern us all. Yet, for reasons discussed in the 
following chapters, safety has not often been the priority in aviation indus-
try decision making. And perhaps most important for you or your family's 
next flight, air safety does not concern the right people—namely, airline 
executives, aviation industry regulators, politicians, watchdog groups, or 
even the flying public—in the right way often enough. I hope this book 
will help change that. 
Almost two decades ago, light years in the evolution of the aviation in-
dustry, several excellent books provided a candid behind-the-scenes look 
at the long history of troubles within US aviation, noting various flaws 
within the airline industry.1 Yet, these books became quickly outdated in 
the post-9/11 aviation business world, as bankruptcy, cost cutting, down-
sizing, merger, employee layoffs (called furloughs), and increased passen-
ger fees with reduced customer service became the norm. Although none 
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of these events are individually unusual in commercial aviation, the extent 
to which they have combined to leverage change during the past ten years 
has been unprecedented. However, few authors have tried to make sense 
of the impact of these drastic changes on airline employees and passenger 
safety until now. 
During this same period social science researchers started examining 
the ways organizations evolved into what is now variously called the "new 
risk economy," "new capitalism," or "flexible capitalism."2 The findings 
of these studies indicate that in many industries employers are provid-
ing less skill training, mentoring, job stability, community support, and 
career advancement while expecting more from employees in terms of 
experience, flexibility, and loyalty.3 Some researchers have even claimed 
employment is now "dead" and that all workers today are essentially 
"self-employed."4 Workers can no longer expect lifetime employment 
with one firm and must develop a variety of different skills—technical 
and psychological—to successfully negotiate the new risk economies' 
flexible market demands. In this book I look at the US airline industry 
as an addition to research on this "flexible economy" and find ample sup-
port for the new economy hypothesis that employers today are providing 
less while expecting more from America's workforce. However, my re-
search also expands on this body of literature by evaluating the implica-
tions of new economy changes for workers in high-risk professions such 
as aviation, which have not been extensively examined. 
Cutting across several business disciplines including corporate social 
responsibility, ethics, leadership, sustainability, and organization studies, 
I adopt a critical theory approach to question the wisdom of accepting the 
virtue of management as self-evident or unproblematic, and to challenge 
managers' single-minded pursuit of short-term profits above all else. Criti-
cal theory scholars have been criticized for a preoccupation with a cynical 
rhetoric over practical attempts to bring about real social change in the 
business world.5 In this book I aim to bridge the gap between theory and 
practice by examining the airline worker-management relationship within 
the framework of the ethical responsibility of airlines, managers, govern-
ment, and regulators to the wider community. This unique framework 
moves critical theory forward by providing a comprehensive analysis of po-
tentialities', not just actualities, pushing critique beyond clever descriptions 
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of existing airline management practices toward an exploration of what 
management could be. 
Instead of seeing management failures as a result of poor behavior by 
individual managers, this socioanalytic approach draws our attention to 
how a particular system of government, business, and regulation can create 
opportunities for abuse. For instance, critical theory scholars have argued 
that as long as the market is the dominant mechanism for allocating re-
sources, employee and community needs, interests, and knowledge will be 
subservient to it, further intensifying managers' focus on financial bottom 
lines and stockholder interests.6 In this book I document the development 
of such dangerous dynamics in the US airline industry. 
An economic war is occurring within the aviation industry in the 
post-9/11 period as managerial short-term profit seeking has been al-
lowed to trump long-term safety concerns with little regulatory over-
sight. One way to redress this imbalance is to recognize the power of 
what Foucault called "subjugated knowledges," those bodies of knowl-
edge that have been disqualified as inadequate, naive, unqualified, low 
ranking, or unscientific.7 By reconceptualizing the idea of risk and 
safety from the vantage point of the disenfranchised, I hope to shift the 
responsibility for safe flight operations away from employees—already 
stressed, fatigued, and working more while earning less—back to the 
airline industry, its regulators, and US society as a whole. As one pilot 
I interviewed succinctly noted, "The way the company puts pressure 
on the employees, it's just a matter of time [before there's an airline ac-
cident.] Something's got to give." Until the substance of these subju-
gated knowledges held by employees can be brought more into focus, 
questions about the escalating risks will remain in the shadows, and 
short-term profit seeking will continue to take precedence over safety in 
increasingly dangerous ways. 
To examine this issue, I draw historical parallels with other industry 
crises. I show how airline executives' fixation on maximizing short-term 
profits at the expense of long-term safety—and government regulators' 
inability to stop them—has resulted in a period of arrogant optimism, 
willful blindness, and entitled insularity in commercial aviation, not 
unlike Wall Street in the years prior to the 2008 financial crisis. I show 
how industry risk management processes have not kept pace with the 
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escalating risk in aviation, just as it didn't on Wall Street before the crash. 
And as several researchers warned about the looming US financial crisis, 
I identify similar hidden fractures in the aviation safety system as well. 
With no government intervention or regulatory supervision on the ho-
rizon, the only question left to ask is if Wall Street could crash, can't the 
airline industry crash too? 
1 
T H E ( N O T SO) SECRET SECRETS 
Awareness about what is happening in the post—September 11, 2001, 
airline industry comes to each of us in different ways with varying inten-
sity. One thing is certain: aviation in the United States changed forever 
after 9/11. Only now, over a decade later, is it becoming apparent how 
much. And I don't just mean increased security measures during the flight 
check-in process. The entire aviation industry has changed radically over 
the past decade with serious risk and safety implications, and certain sec-
tors continue to hope no one will "alarm the passengers." 
We know what happened on 9/11. And we also know about the eco-
nomic instability of the aviation industry that followed. But what is less 
frequently discussed is why that instability really occurred and where the 
decisions made to address it are taking us now. Commercial airline ex-
ecutives want us to believe that the terrorist attacks caused the post-9/11 
aviation industry downturn thus creating the current hypercompetitive 
environment. They use that logic to justify charging fees for everything 
from soft drinks and pillows to ticket changes and checked baggage. 
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It's a lucrative strategy. In 2011, the top airlines at the time (United, Delta, 
American, Southwest, US Airways, and Alaska) generated $3.4 billion in 
revenue from checked bags, up from $464 million in 2007, the year most 
airlines began the practice. These airlines also collected $2.4 billion from 
passenger penalty fees for rebooking nonrefundable reservations. Add in 
other incidentals and we find passengers paid an astonishing $12.4 billion 
in extra fees in 2011 alone—and this revenue is not taxed like traditional 
airfares.1 
Yet, well before that crisp fall day in New York, informed insiders con-
sidered the aviation industry overdue for an adjustment. September 11 
simply handed the already struggling airlines a popularly accepted ex-
cuse to downsize and adopt other changes executives had long wanted to 
implement. Major airlines used the event as an excuse to slash jobs, elimi-
nating over two hundred thousand employees in the post-9/l 1 period, all 
the while eliciting sympathy and government support as one of the most 
visible images of America's struggle against terrorism. As of 2010, airline 
employees continued to give up more than $12 billion a year in wages, 
benefits, pensions, and other work rules, while over 10,000 pilot jobs had 
disappeared at major air carriers.2 (Table 1 reflects total layoffs and hiring 
2000-2012.) 
Like a clever magic trick, industry leaders used 9/11 as a foil, distract-
ing the public by blaming the airlines' financial slump on war, recession, 
terrorism, and travel scares such as SARS (severe acute respiratory syn-
drome), while pointing to rising fuel costs, greedy employees, aggressive 
labor groups, and frugal consumers' bargain shopping online to explain 
airline insolvencies. Meanwhile, US air carriers quietly pocketed over 
$2 trillion in revenue between 2000 and 2012,3 and airline executives earned 
millions of dollars for themselves (fig. 1). Consider Jeffrey A. Smisek, 
president and CEO of United Continental Holdings, the company created 
after the United-Continental merger in 2010. Number 123 on the list of 
America's highest-paid CEOs, Smisek earned $13.3 million in compen-
sation in 2011, falling just behind Wall Street executives such as Jamie 
Dimon of JP Morgan Chase, Lloyd C. Blankfein of Goldman Sachs, and 
Vikram S. Pandit of Citigroup.4 
You might think that staying out of bankruptcy was the primary job of 
an airline executive. However, in an odd twist of the bankruptcy process, 
on exiting Chapter 11 airline management teams typically keep between 
TABLE 1. Total number of pilots per US airline, 2000-2012* 
United 
Northwest 
Delta 
US Airways 
American 
Continental 
Southwest 
JetBlue 
Total 
2000 
11,278 
5,981 
9,123 
5,330 
10,408 
4,656 
3,316 
75 
50,167 
2001 
9,968 
6,103 
8,103 
4,649 
10,586 
4,571 
3,725 
236 
47,941 
2002 
7,992 
5,534 
8,074 
3,743 
12,297 
4,209 
3,966 
371 
46,186 
2003 
7,688 
5,112 
7,155 
3,147 
10,857 
3,852 
4,022 
591 
42,424 
2004 
6,374 
4,942 
6,786 
2,967 
9,929 
3,943 
4,197 
809 
39,947 
2005 
6,133 
4,995 
6,181 
2,599 
9,074 
4,184 
4,535 
1,059 
38,760 
2006 
6,277 
4,531 
5,706 
3,132 
8,572 
4,408 
4,845 
1,451 
38,922 
2007 
6,338 
4,340 
5,904 
4,278 
8,343 
4,598 
5,317 
1,707 
40,825 
2008 
6,350 
4,345 
6,391 
4,234 
8,306 
4,578 
5,588 
1,794 
41,586 
2009 
5,581 
3,426 
6,581 
4,073 
8,092 
4,227 
5,626 
1,795 
39,401 
2010 
5,515 
0 
10,701 
3,967 
7,934 
4,199 
5,564 
1,828 
39,708 
2011 
5,490 
0 
10,708 
4,003 
8,029 
4,139 
5,676 
2,021 
40,066 
2012 
9,899 
0 
10,606 
4,035 
7,737 
0 
8,866 
2,183 
43,326 
% 
Change 
-12 
-100 
16 
-24 
-26 
-100 
167 
2,811 
-14 
Source: "PlO-Annual Employee Statistics by Labor Category," Research and Innovative Technology Administration, US Bureau of Transportation Statistics, http://www. 
rita.dot.gov/bts/sites/rita.dot.gov.bts/files/subject_areas/airline_information/number_of_employees/labor_category/index.html. Table created by the author. 
* US Airways merged with America West in 2005; Delta acquired Northwest in 2008; United and Continental merged in 2010; Southwest acquired AirTran in 2011. 
Numbers reflect these changes. 
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Figure 1. US airline revenue in billions of dollars, 2000-2012. Source: Data from http://www. 
transtats.bts.gov/Data_Elements_Financial.aspx ? Data=7. 
5 and 10 percent of the company's shares. CEOs often keep 1 percent just 
for themselves.5 That means managers are handsomely rewarded for get-
ting their company out of financial messes they created in the first place. It 
is a nice payoff for stiffing creditors, wiping out shareholders, furloughing 
employees, and alienating passengers. Over the last several decades, this is 
where airline CEOs have gotten rich. United's CEO Glenn Tilton received 
a pay package worth nearly $40 million in new shares and other compensa-
tion after the airline emerged from bankruptcy in 2005. Northwest's CEO 
Doug Steenland received a package worth some $26.6 million when the 
company emerged from Chapter 11 in 2007. And the process continues to 
this day, unregulated.6 
In 2012, American Airlines and US Airways were negotiating a merger 
as well. Most industry analysts agree that American, the third-largest US 
airline, and US Airways, the fourth-largest, will eventually have to merge 
if they are to stand a chance of competing against the United-Continental 
and Delta-Northwest conglomerates. However, American's CEO, Tom 
Horton, and his management team will profit more if American emerges 
from bankruptcy first, earning them somewhere between $300 and $600 
million. Meanwhile, US Airways' CEO Doug Parker's contract has a 
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change-of-control provision that could earn him more than $20 million if 
his airline is bought by another company and he is forced out.7 
During this same period, when airline executives like Tilton, Smisek, 
Steenland, and their management teams were collecting record compensa-
tion, thousands of their airlines' employees remained out of work. When 
challenged about this inequity, airline executives defended their manage-
rial decisions and compensation strategies. Like the financial industry's 
defensiveness about Wall Street's executive bonuses paid just months 
after the $700 billion government bailout of the Street's "troubled assets" 
in 2008, airlines justified the post-9/11 executive rewards as appropriate 
and necessary to attract and retain top performers.8 Are these high-priced, 
short-term managerial strategies—and the shady deals and organiza-
tional culture they foster—mere coincidence, or are there identifiable pat-
terns between the business practices of these two boom-or-bust American 
industries? 
Both finance and aviation have long histories of secret deals and po-
litical gamesmanship behind exorbitant financial wins and losses. As both 
industries became increasingly deregulated over the past few decades, a 
new type of manager took over the executive suites, and troubling evi-
dence emerged of a managerial fixation on maximizing short-term profits 
for themselves at the expense of long-term company sustainability while 
disregarding the resultant systemic risks. The following chapters unpack 
the details of this confluence of events. For now, let us consider that if this 
pattern of risk taking brought Wall Street to the brink of collapse in 2008, 
might growing cracks in the airline industry related to self-serving risk 
taking be threatening air safety as well? 
My review of government documents and accident reports, along with in-
terviews with hundreds of aviation industry professionals, provides evi-
dence that hidden fractures have been widening in the aviation industry 
in ways alarmingly resonant with patterns preceding the financial crisis of 
2008.9 Contrary to the Federal Aviation Administration's (FAA) claim that 
"this is the golden age of safety, the safest period in the safest mode, in the 
history of the world,"10 we seem to be entering a period of unprecedented 
global risk. Perhaps US Airways Captain Chesley "Sully" Sullenberger, 
the pilot who landed his Airbus-turned-glider on the icy surface of the 
Hudson River, said it best when he spoke to Congress in 2009." Voicing 
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concerns held by most veteran airline employees, he testified, "While I love 
my profession, I do not like what has happened to it." US airline employ-
ees "have been hit by an economic tsunami." Citing bankruptcies, layoffs, 
pension loss, pay cuts, mergers, and "revolving door management teams 
who have used airline employees as an ATM" as causes for the turmoil, 
Captain Sullenberger confided that he was "deeply worried" about safety 
and the industry's future, claiming, "I do not know a single professional 
airline pilot who wants his or her children to follow in their footsteps." 
With airlines no longer able to "attract the best and the brightest" to avia-
tion careers, he worried that "future pilots" will be "less experienced and 
less skilled" with "negative consequences to the flying public—and to our 
country." To avoid this, he insisted that "airline companies must refocus 
their attention—and their resources—on the recruitment and retention of 
highly experienced, well trained pilots," making that a priority "at least 
equal to their financial bottom line."12 
Captain Sullenberger is not alone in expressing these concerns. The 
chaotic state of the post-9/11 aviation industry generated such widespread 
attention in Congress that the Government Accounting Office (GAO) was 
asked to investigate the implications of airline bankruptcies, mergers, loss 
of pension plans, and high fuel prices, and even consider re-regulating 
the struggling industry.13 One study claimed that "the airline bankruptcy 
process is well developed and understood" and went on to document the 
liquidation of employee pension plans, offering examples of the signifi-
cant loss of benefits senior airline employees, such as Captain Sullenberger, 
will experience when they retire. Yet it nonetheless contended there is "no 
evidence" that bankruptcy "harms the industry."14 Another report noted, 
"The historically high number of airline bankruptcies and liquidations is 
a reflection of the industry's inherent instability."15 However, the GAO 
failed to investigate the implications of this instability for employees or 
passengers. In fact, not one of the government's reports considered the 
impact of this tumultuous climate of outsourcing, mergers, downsizing, 
furloughs, and changing work rules on employees, their job performance, 
risk, or airline safety. 
What do I mean when I talk about risk and safety? Risk is commonly un-
derstood as a situation involving exposure to danger, harm, or loss. And 
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safety is the process of controlling situations to minimize exposure to these 
hazards. How can managing risk and safety be a profitable process? In 
the nineteenth century, commercial trade in risk emerged as a commod-
ity much like the exchange of timber, cotton, and tobacco. Marine insur-
ance became the first form of risk management when merchants insured 
their cargo against "perils of the sea" and insurers sold these policies to 
each other for financial gain.16 Since then, shifting risk has become a lucra-
tive business strategy. 
As corporations began to amass extraordinary wealth, questions soon 
followed about whether industrial profit making should come from as-
suming risk, as with marine insurance, or from reducing it through bet-
ter work practices.17 In response, three risk-related roles emerged in the 
corporate industrial economy: the entrepreneurial "risk-maker" who 
jumpstarts the industrial process, the financial "risk-taker" who invests in 
corporations and their stock, and the managerial "risk-reducer" who ra-
tionally supervises economic production.18 Over time, neoliberalism, and 
the increasingly deregulated marketplace associated with it, blurred the 
boundaries between these risk management roles, as executives, previously 
risk-reducers, now adopted risk-maker strategies throughout corporate 
America. I will return to this important managerial shift and its implica-
tions for risk and safety. 
Obviously, no airline flight, business decision, or financial investment 
is 100 percent risk free. So what then are acceptable levels of risk? It de-
pends. To determine which air safety regulations to adopt and which situa-
tions to risk, the FAA, nicknamed the "tombstone agency" for basing their 
decisions on body counts,19 conducts a cost-benefit analysis. "The basic 
approach taken to value an avoided fatality," the FAA explained, "is to 
determine how much an individual or group of individuals is willing to 
pay for a small reduction in risk."20 For instance, the FAA might weigh 
the risk of a fatal accident occurring every year by considering the loss of 
the aircraft ($100 million) and the death of its one hundred passengers, 
each life valued at $3 million ($300 million) versus the cost to airlines to fix 
a reoccurring mechanical flaw ($10 million) in every airplane of this type 
in service (1,000).21 In this example, the aviation industry would accept the 
risk of $400 million—and, more important, the risk of an airplane crash 
annually and the death of one hundred people as a result of this mechanical 
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failure—rather than adopt a regulation that forces airlines to fix the prob-
lem at a cost of $10 billion. This may sound reminiscent of the Ford Pinto 
fiasco from the 1970s. 
At that time, in an effort to compete in the burgeoning yet lucrative 
small-car market, the Ford Motor Company introduced a new subcom-
pact car called the Pinto. It was rushed to market to capitalize on Ameri-
can's new desire for cheap, fuel-efficient vehicles, "The Little Carefree 
Car," as the Pinto was advertised, became everything but untroubled. 
During preproduction crash tests, Ford engineers discovered that the 
car's fuel tank was vulnerable to explosion during rear-end collisions.22 
Yet Ford executives reportedly conducted a cost-benefit analysis, com-
paring the cost to reinforce the Pinto's rear end ($121 million) against 
the chance of collision and cost of lawsuits ($50 million).23 They decided 
it was cheaper to accept the risk. For eight years Ford lobbied against 
increased safety standards and paid millions to crash victims out of court 
rather than fixing the $11 per-car problem.24 Twenty-seven people died 
as a result.25 
Although the Ford Pinto became a famous business school case study in 
shoddy ethics and helped spawn the field of corporate social responsibility, 
there is still more we can take away from the case than just a lesson in bad 
management. What this case, and others I discuss in this book, exemplify 
is how corporate leaders have quietly shifted their role from risk-reducers 
to risk-makers over the last few decades, forcing American consumers to 
become the ultimate risk-takers, in ways often unknown to them. 
Are there safeguards within the system designed to address these con-
cerns about escalating risk and diminishing safety? Aren't government 
regulators, airline management, employee labor unions, and consumer 
watchdog groups monitoring aviation industry developments and, per-
haps most important, long-term passenger safety? The simple answer 
is that the required oversight is either not happening at all or not fast 
enough to keep pace with the rate of aviation industry changes over the 
past decade. 
Like Wall Street before the crash, airlines have been free to pursue 
economically driven agendas with little regulation or incentive to con-
sider the wider risks. In part, the reason is that cost-benefit analyses have 
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become so prevalent and fatal aviation accidents seem to have become so 
rare. It is commonly believed that the chance of being killed on a com-
mercial flight is about 8 million to 1—far safer than other forms of trans-
portation.26 For example, the US Bureau of Transportation Statistics' 
2008 study (the most recent) reported fewer than 600 airline fatalities an-
nually, while almost 38,000 people died in motor vehicles and nearly 800 
on railroads.27 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology professor Arnold Barnett has 
made a career out of consulting to airlines and studying aviation fatali-
ties. He uses applied probabilistic and statistical modeling, a risk assess-
ment method similarly adopted by Wall Street quantitative analysts, or 
"quants," before the 2008 financial industry crash.28 How this occurred on 
Wall Street will be discussed further in chapter 5. Through these math-
ematical models Barnett and his team of aviation quants concluded that 
the chance of dying in a US airline jet crash is 1 in 22.8 million commercial 
flights.29 "A traveler would have to fly every day for more than 64,000 years 
before dying in an accident," he contends.3" "Fatal accidents are on the 
verge of extinction."31 
Yet, fatality data, like cost-benefit analyses, can be deceiving as a measure 
of overall risk and safety. Captain Sullenberger notes, "It's important not to 
define safety as the absence of accidents,"32 and most pilots I interviewed for 
this book agreed. They worried that the apparent rarity of aviation deaths 
has caused passengers to become indifferent, regulators lackadaisical, and 
airlines complacent about air safety. Like another magic trick, contradic-
tory evidence is there to see for those who know where to look. In fact, 70 
percent of the pilots I surveyed believe post-9/11 cost cutting has made it 
likely that a major airline accident will occur in the coming years. It is not 
a matter of if—only a matter of when (fig. 2). 
Nonetheless, in 2013 the front page of the New Yor\ Times proclaimed 
that "flying on a commercial jetliner has never been safer."33 What has led 
to this disparity of opinion? Captain Sullenberger has noted how airline 
employees have, in some ways, contributed to this illusion, a victim of their 
own success. "We make it look too easy," he argued. When "it's possible 
to go several calendar years without a single fatality" in a jet crash at a 
major US airline, the public starts to see airlines as "ultrasafe," and it be-
comes "easy to forget what's really at stake" when flying on a commercial 
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Figure 2. US airline pilots' rating of likeliness of airline accident. Source: "How likely do you 
feel it is that a major airline accident will occur in the coming years due to post-9/11 airline cost 
cutting?" Author's survey data, no. 10. 
flight.34 Echoing pilots' concerns, Mike Ambrose, director of the European 
Regions Airline Association, expressed alarm as well. Today's airline man-
agers have no experience with aviation accidents, he argued. They "tend 
to believe this level of safety is a given, so will more easily pass responsibil-
ity for safety down the authority chain," making it less of a financial and 
managerial priority.35 
Former inspector general of the US Department of Transportation 
(DOT) Mary Schiavo agrees, noting how aviation industry leaders have 
become adept at manipulating the illusion of safety without making any 
substantive changes: 
When a plane goes down in flames and dozens or hundreds of lives are 
lost, what the public most wants is reassurance—reassurance that the acci-
dent was a fluke, that flying is statistically the safest way to travel and that 
someone is watching over aviation to guarantee it is safe. FAA officials and 
members of Congress automatically take to the airwaves, vying to outdo 
themselves with sound bites about oversight and safety.... [However] once 
the media scrutiny passes, the safety problem will be gone too.36 
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In addition, the random nature of accidents and the way federal agencies 
quantify safety makes the apparently low aviation fatality rate, particularly 
when compared with other modes of transportation, attributable to luck 
and data manipulation. 
For instance, aviation quants' statistical models often only consider fatal 
jet crashes, ignoring all other kinds of aviation accidents such as general 
aviation aircraft, cargo carriers, and turbo-propeller (turboprop) airplanes. 
This oversight is particularly problematic because regional air carriers and 
their turboprops now provide over half of domestic air service in the United 
States.37 Eliminating their operations from the mathematical model sig-
nificantly skews the findings. When challenged about the selective nature 
of this data set, aviation quants admit the occurrence of just one accident 
would sway their results. For example, they concede including Air France 
Flight 447, which crashed into the Atlantic Ocean in 2009 killing all 216 
passengers and 12 aircrew, in the data would drop fatality statistics from 1 
in 22.8 million to about 1 in 14 million flights—a 37 percent decline.38 
Other experts have voiced similar concerns about over-relying on statis-
tical modeling. John Breit, former head of market-risk oversight at Merrill 
Lynch and one of the first to build value-at-risk (VaR) financial models for 
Wall Street, notes that mathematical models like these often disguise risk, 
not reveal it. Instead of fixating on statistics, Breit recommends that risk 
managers develop what spies call humint—"human intelligence from flesh 
and blood sources"—a network of frontline people who will report when 
things don't seem right before a major problem occurs.39 
With so many questions surrounding the reliability of applied probabi-
listic and statistical modeling to assess real-world risk, whether in finance 
or aviation, why then do these quantitative models remain attractive? As 
Breit observes, their popularity "is all in the interests of senior manage-
ment and regulators to avoid blame. They may not think they can prevent 
the next crisis, but they can blame the statistics" for informing their deci-
sions after the fact.40 
Besides disguising risk and creating a false sense of security, there is a 
third problem with aviation quants' probabilistic and statistical modeling 
risk assessment methods. Researchers who study organizational decision 
making agree that disasters rarely spontaneously occur out of nowhere, 
as mathematical models imply.41 Instead, problems often "incubate,"42 
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sometimes for years, as organizations slowly "drift towards failure,"43 
until one day factors align in a "window of accident opportunity."44 These 
disasters are so inevitable, and the warning signs that precede them are 
often so clear, scholars have taken to calling them "normal accidents,"45 
not because of their frequency, but because they are the normal conse-
quence of increasingly complex operating systems that challenge human 
sense making in unanticipated ways.46 Yet, they are nonetheless disasters 
that, with a little bit of awareness and imagination, we could have seen 
coming. 
In their thought-provoking book Predictable Surprises: The Disasters You 
Should Have Seen Coming and How to Prevent Them, Max Bazerman and 
Michael Watkins offered several generalizable characteristics as signs of 
impending disaster.47 First, leaders are aware that there is a problem and 
many people recognize the problem is escalating, yet fixing the problem 
would incur significant short-term costs with questionable long-term re-
turn on this investment. Next, since there is a natural human tendency 
to maintain the status quo, resistance to change is allowed to dominate. 
Finally, this resistance is fueled by a small yet vocal minority who benefit 
from inaction and are motivated to subvert leadership efforts for their own 
private benefit. As a result of these pressures, decision makers are reluctant 
to risk taking action in the present in order to prevent a potential disaster 
in the future, particularly if they are unlikely to receive credit for averting 
it and have mathematical models to back them up.48 
The history of aviation disasters is replete with examples of this type of 
flawed thinking. For instance, in the early 1990s, safety analysts predicted 
that even if aviation industry accident rates remained constant, the antici-
pated 3—4 percent annual industry growth would result in a near doubling 
of US air crashes by the turn of the twenty-first century. Alarmed by these 
statistics and prompted by two seemingly mysterious 1996 aviation acci-
dents and the corresponding 340 fatalities—the midair explosion of T W A 
Flight 800 and the inflight fire aboard Valujet Flight 592—President Bill 
Clinton created the White House Commission on Aviation Safety and Se-
curity led by Vice President AI Gore.49 
Initially, the commission recognized that there were escalating prob-
lems in the US commercial airline industry and held both airline executives 
and the FAA responsible for repairing the broken aviation system. They 
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laudably recommended a reduction in accidents by a "factor of five within 
a decade" and a re-engineering of the FAA's regulatory and certification 
programs.50 That was, until resistance to change was allowed to dominate, 
just as the Bazerman and Watkins model predicted. The airlines flexed 
their political clout, lobbyists mobilized, the FAA stonewalled, and the 
price of change became too high in the government's cost-benefit analysis. 
Politicians, reluctant to risk a decline in popularity or donations during 
an election year over a questionable long-term gain on issues they would 
likely not get credit for, waffled on key points. 
As a result, the final report moved from a tough call to action for the 
aviation industry as a whole to a watered-down version condoning busi-
ness as usual. Airline executives, who presumably had the most to gain by 
improving air safety, did everything possible to block meaningful reform, 
and in doing so denied the very real possibility that a predictable surprise 
' was likely to occur. Since then predictable surprises have occurred in the 
form of several aviation accidents and near misses that airlines would 
rather not discuss (detailed in chapters 5 and 6). 
One shining moment on Gore's White House Commission was when 
; Commissioner M. Victoria Cummock stubbornly refused to endorse the 
committee's final report because it "contains no specific call to action, no 
':. commitments to address aviation safety and security system-wide," and 
,• "no deadlines." She suggested "that all recommendations be re-written 
;'i for specific actions by specific agencies," otherwise, "once again, we will 
| allow the airlines to lead and the government to follow." In conclusion, she 
» stated, "I cannot sign a report that blatantly allows the American flying 
{ public to be placed regularly at 'unnecessary risk.' "51 
[ As validation of Commissioner Cummock's concerns, one predictable 
• surprise that might have been averted had her recommendations regard-
:
 ing a system wide commitment to improving airline safety and security 
- been adopted was the terrorist event of 9/11. Instead, airlines were once 
l again allowed to prioritize short-term profits at the expense of long-term 
|i safety, disregarding the resultant systemic risks. 
I Who should we believe? Is the US airline industry heading for a pre-
': dictable surprise, or is this the golden age of safety and stability in which 
;• fatal aviation accidents and other dangerous situations are on the verge of 
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extinction? The spectrum of expert opinion makes the issue of air safety 
confusing and assessing real risks difficult. Yet an opportunity to explore 
this question in the post-9/11 period came about when the National Aero-
nautics and Space Administration (NASA) sponsored a study called the 
National Aviation Operations Monitoring System (NAOMS), which ex-
amined everyday aviation operations before an accident occurs for clues to 
systemic vulnerabilities. 
Over 24,000 pilots had been interviewed between 2001 and 2004— 
almost one third of the US commercial airline pilot population—when the 
study was suddenly terminated.52 The data remained unused for two years 
until an anonymous NASA whistleblower informed the Associated Press, 
which filed a Freedom of Information Act request. Initially denied access 
because, NASA noted, the data "could materially affect the public confi-
dence in, and the commercial welfare of, the air carriers," a Congressional 
inquiry finally forced release of the data in 2007.53 Yet the data produced 
was in a format that made it nearly impossible for outsiders to analyze. 
When asked about this, NASA administrator Michael Griffin replied, 
"We were asked to release the data and I said that we would, and I've done 
that."54 
What was so troubling in the study's findings that NASA risked ac-
cusations it was prioritizing airlines' financial interests over public safety 
concerns in order to hide it? A review of the NAOMS data produced 
some clues. Numerous inconsistencies with other governmental statistical 
reports emerged, potentially tarnishing the FAA's "golden age of safety" 
image and aviation quants' predictions that accidents are on the verge of 
extinction. For instance, NAOMS data showed four times the number of 
engine failures and twice the number of bird strikes and near midair col-
lisions than did other government monitoring systems, which called into 
question the ways aviation safety was measured. When pressed about these 
inconsistencies, Griffin criticized the NAOMS "reporting mechanism," 
calling the project "poorly organized" and the data "not properly peer re-
viewed" and likening it to "hangar talk."55 
NAOMS researchers Jon Krosnick, Stanford University professor, 
and Robert Dodd, principal investigator, defended their work. Their de-
fense, the $11.5 million NASA spent sponsoring this study, and the high 
response rate from pilots raises suspicions about the motivations behind 
NASA's abrupt decision to abandon the project. As Congressman Brad 
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Miller noted, "If 80% of the pilots [asked agreed] to sit still for a half-hour 
survey, voluntarily, my conclusion is the pilots had something they wanted 
others to know about."56 Why don't some people want to hear what they 
had to say? 
The N O A M S study was not the only inquiry into aviation safety is-
sues that required whistleblowers to force government to take action 
over the past decade. Two FAA aviation safety inspectors testified before 
the 2008 House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure on the 
regulatory relationship between the FAA and the airline industry; they 
claimed that the FAA knowingly allowed Southwest Airlines to oper-
ate unsafe aircraft over a period of several years.57 The inspectors tried 
to raise warnings for years about this problem, yet they were repeatedly 
undermined by FAA managers in their efforts to increase surveillance of 
airline maintenance.58 
The committee found that these were common employee complaints 
at the FAA. Several aviation safety inspectors reported "that they found it 
difficult to bring enforcement action against airlines because FAA man-
agement appeared to be 'too close to airline management. '" They reported 
feeling "pressure from management to not identify too many problems 
with an airline" or else they might face "retribution."59 A typical confession 
was, "I often don't even bother" bringing airline violations forward "be-
cause I know FAA management won't do anything with it."60 As a result, 
the committee found "extensive evidence," that "points toward a systemic 
pattern of FAA failure to exercise the required regulatory oversight" over 
US airlines.61 
Although these results were identified in 2008, little seems to have 
changed since then. Similar to criticisms of Wall Street before the financial 
crisis, many aviation insiders believe the government's regulatory system, 
established over five decades ago, is just too antiquated to keep up with 
today's technologically complex, globalized airline industry. Of the pilots I 
interviewed, only 5 percent reported aviation regulators as "competent" in 
supervising safety in the US commercial airline industry; 66 percent rated 
regulators as either "incompetent" or "very incompetent" (fig. 3). Simi-
larly, Stuart Matthews, president of Flight Safety Foundation, succinctly 
noted, "The FAA was simply never created to deal with the environment 
that has been produced by deregulation of the air transport industry."62 
And, in many ways, regulators agree. 
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Figure 3. US airline pilots' rating of aviation industry regulators. Source: "How competent 
are regulators at supervising safety in the US commercial airline industry?" Author's survey 
data, no. 15. 
A 2005 internal FAA management memo entitled "A Time for 
Change" expressed with concern how the FAA had "retreated from the 
proper exertion of our influence and authority" and relaxed "into a level 
of coziness" with airlines, settling "for winks, nods, verbals, and emails" 
instead of proper business protocol.65 Yet, with only about 3,600 aviation-
safety inspectors, the FAA knows its personnel is inadequate to oversee 
all aspects of flight operations and aircraft maintenance under its jurisdic-
tion. To offset this shortage, the FAA developed "partnership programs" 
in the 1990s to encourage a more collaborative relationship with airlines as 
"customers." Although civil-penalty programs were a priority in the past, 
and often resulted in substantial fines and negative airline publicity, the 
FAA revised its focus, instituting several "voluntary programs" to encour-
age airlines, pilots, and mechanics to "self-disclose" noncompliance in a 
collaborative effort to share important safety information.64 
This collaborative approach sounds good in theory, but not everyone 
is convinced this type of self-monitoring regulatory strategy can work. It 
didn't work on Wall Street before the 2008 crash. Prior to the 1990s, the 
FAA was a "cop on the beat," inspecting "everything from the nuts and 
bolts in your tool kit to the paperwork in the cockpit" and handing out 
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hefty penalties to those who broke the rules.65 After 9/11, critics noted, the 
FAA's more collaborative approach "went too far" in "coddling the air-
lines" and drifting too far "toward over-closeness and coziness between 
regulator and regulated."66 The history of the Boeing 787 Dreamliner is an 
example of the risks of this cozy relationship. 
Although the Dreamliner was initially touted as a revolution in aero-
space design and manufacturing, production of the 787 quickly became 
an engineering nightmare. The project was fraught with delays and over-
runs, and delivery only occurred in 2011—three years behind schedule and 
billions of dollars over budget—the worst production record in Boeing's 
history.67 Much of the 787's problems were a direct result of the complexity 
of its new, more collaborative manufacturing and certification process. In 
order to save money, only 40 percent of the plane was built by Boeing in 
house; the rest was outsourced to over fifty different subcontractors around 
the world, which created ample opportunity for errors.68 When mechanics 
finally assembled the first plane in 2007, they found a gap of nearly half an 
inch between the cockpit section and the body of the airplane.69 This was 
just the beginning of the problems. 
A little over a year after release, the Dreamliner was grounded again 
when battery fires erupted in two planes. In one case, the fire burned so 
intensely it took Boston firefighters forty minutes to put the blaze out.70 
Although the danger inherent in using lithium batteries in airplanes was 
well known, in the spirit of collaboration, the FAA let Boeing develop its 
own inspection protocol, establish the safety standards, perform the tests, 
and certificate its own work.71 
The final frightening fact is that only three months after the grounding, 
the FAA recertified the 787 for flight carrying the same lithium batteries 
that had ignited without ever determining the root cause of the battery 
fires. Japanese pilots, who flew twenty-seven of the fifty-seven Dreamlin-
ers then in service, worried that Boeing hadn't done enough to address 
the danger. "Boeing says that any battery fire will now go out on its own, 
so there's no safety issue," Japanese pilots' union spokesperson Toshikazu 
Nagasawa said. He added, "But that's on paper. N o pilot would ever want 
to keep flying with a fire on board."72 Yet, regulators and airline execu-
tives in Japan and the US seem unconcerned. Once again, short-term profit 
seeking has trumped employees' safety concerns and the best interests of 
the flying public. 
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Meanwhile, Congress has largely stayed on the periphery of the 787 
safety debate. This unusual bipartisan silence reflects Boeing's political 
clout, a position sustained by hefty political campaign contributions and 
$83 million spent on lobbying between 2008 and 2013.73 The bottom line 
is industry regulators have put aviation industry leaders in control of air 
safety while employees and passengers are strapped in for the ride. 
2 
T H E ROOTS OF TURBULENCE 
Even before there was a commercial airline industry, the fledgling field 
of aviation was already a risky and competitive business where major play-
ers, struggling to outdo one another, were not beyond pilfering a profit-
able idea. For instance, while most any schoolchild can credit Orville and 
Wilbur Wright for the invention of powered flight in 1903, it is more accu-
rate to say that the Ohio bicycle manufacturers synthesized the best aspects 
of many inventors' experimentation and innovation—such as Sir George 
Cayley, Otto Lilienthal, and Percy Pilcher—to build their Wright Flyer? 
In the early 1800s, Sir George Cayley built a "flying parachute," itself 
a knockoff of Chinese kites built around 1,000 BC, to study lift, drag, 
and flight controllability, while other inventors such as Samuel Hen-
son were still fascinated with steam power. Henson proposed an "aerial 
steam carriage" that included many elements of modern-day airplanes. 
Yet, the steam engine was too heavy to get airborne. Several other re-
searchers, such as machine gun inventor Sir Hiram Maxim, focused on 
this power issue as well. "Give us a motor," Maxim wrote, "and we will 
